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Abstract: 
This paper presents a mapping framework for design factors and implementation process for building credible Industrial Control Systems 
(ICS) security testbeds. The resilience of ICSs has become a critical concern to operators and governments following widely publicised cyber 
security events. The inability to apply conventional Information Technology security practice to ICSs further compounds challenges in 
adequately securing critical systems. To overcome these challenges, and do so without impacting live environments, testbeds for the 
exploration, development and evaluation of security controls are widely used. However, how a testbed is designed and its attributes, can 
directly impact not only its viability but also its credibility as a whole. Through a combined systematic and thematic analysis and mapping 
of ICS security testbed design attributes, this paper suggests that the expertise of human experimenters, design objectives, the implementation 
approach, architectural coverage, core characteristics, and evaluation methods; are considerations that can help establish or enhance 
confidence, trustworthiness and acceptance; thus, credibility of ICS security testbeds. 
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1. Introduction 
Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) are essential components 
of critical national infrastructures (CNIs) that control societal 
services, e.g. power generation, water treatment, and transport 
infrastructure. Whilst advances in technology have improved 
ICS functionality through fundamental design, setup, and 
operational scope, the reality is much more challenging. ICSs 
can have real-world deployment life cycles measured in 
decades, leading to outdated and insecure legacy systems 
running alongside modern, more secure deployments. The 
security of ICSs has become a growing concern owing to 
observed challenges and real-world cyber-attacks 1. Where ICSs 
form a core component of CNI, they must provide high levels of 
system safety, availability, security, and operational resilience. 
These requirements can be tied to several factors, where the 
impact of failure from economic, environmental, human safety, 
and national security perspectives would be highly detrimental 
2. In addition, testing these requirements is often impracticable 
in real-life ICS operational environments because of the 
potential disruption to process functions that can occur 3,4. 
 
 
Testbed development has grown to the point where 
replicating ICS networks through modelling and simulation 
(M&S) is considered a viable alternative for exploring and 
addressing cybersecurity challenges 5. This is, in part, due to the 
high cost of deploying and using real system hardware and 
software for testing purposes, and the obvious risks linked to 
conducting research-based tests upon live ICSs or Operational 
Technology (OT). In M&S, a model of an actual system or 
problem is used rather than directly working on the real (actual) 
physical system. 
 
Emulation of ICS can be approached in various ways  
providing exploratory platforms upon which experimentation 
and training can be performed safely, avoiding socio-economic 
impacts associated with performance degradation 6. This process 
is more technically referred to as ‘Simulation’, and is widely 
acknowledged to be effective in experimenting, studying, 
analysing, and developing ICS security solution best practices 7. 
Whilst the term ‘Simulation’ is commonplace, often such 
environments can also be referred to as ‘Testbeds’. This 
encompasses the range of setups that include hardware-in-the-
loop (HIL) as a step between ‘computer simulation’ and 
‘physical operational hardware simulation’.   These provide test 
platforms for executing activities and processes as if in a real-
world environment. For clarity, and for the remainder of this 
paper, we will use testbeds as an all-inclusive term. 
 
A number of ICS testbeds have been developed and reported 
by researchers to analyse or address security-related challenges 
8. These papers describe a range of approaches to the research 7. 
A key challenge is to model and simulate real control system 
conditions accurately and with enough detail to support 
confidence in the simulated system together with its attributes 
and processes, thus enhancing trustworthiness and acceptability. 
Confidence depicts a state of certainty, either about the 
correctness of a hypothesis or prediction, or the effectiveness of 
that a specified course of action.  
 
Herein, we refer to the confidence, trustworthiness, and 
acceptability characteristics as ‘credibility’. In M&S, credibility 
is effectively synonymous with confidence, trustworthiness and 
acceptability, and are often used interchangeably 9–11. Relative 
to M&S testbeds, credibility refers to that attribute of a testbed 
information and development process that involves the belief of 
the observer/user. Thus, credibility perception is intrinsically 
subjective. It is loosely tied to the information about the 
derivation process of a testbed, so that the reliability of the 
process only adds to credibility if the observer/user well-
understands and appreciates the process and associated 
limitations 12. Consequently, to trust the credibility of testbed 
information and development process, an observe/user must also 
trust that the testbed authors have the appropriate competency to 
apply the process, and did so correctly 
 
The testbed constructs in most publications focus on specific 
sectors or applications but lack detailed and sufficient views 
about the testbed use and results. In addition, testbed constructs 
appear characterised by dissimilar approaches to developing and 
demonstrating security M&S research 13. These introduce 
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uncertainties and weak arguments for the reliability of each 
contribution, which is exacerbated by trade-offs between 
obtaining ‘generality' to a broader set of ICS applications or 
‘specificity' to a specific pressing operational process or 
application problem at hand.  
 
In this work, we interpret credibility as; how well a security 
testbed (system, process, and (or) outputs) is able to reflect and 
advance confidence, trustworthiness and acceptability as a 
correct representation of a real system 14, and suitable to use for 
explorative cases or scenarios. This, definition of credibility 
links to the non-inclusion or non-coverage of certain model 
design/simulation attributes that can add to a strong reflection of 
a real system. For ICS security testbeds, this is important as it 
can impact the accurate resolution of security and safety issues 
in real ICS. Simulation credibility can suggest how well a 
system, process, component, and/or outputs reliably re(presents) 
the actual system. One way of achieving this is through outlining 
the relevant design considerations or factors that support 
development and use, and which can support confidence and 
acceptability. We have not found any work that sufficiently 
addresses this. This presents another challenge when developing 
capabilities to support research objectives and when evaluating 
the quality of a testbed and related research. Thus, it is difficult 
to make statements or to demonstrate how previous work 
supports or improves confidence in actual ICS scenarios. It is 
previously acknowledged that having and following a 
guiding/benchmarking structure is crucial in proving the 
relevance and significance of ICS testbeds and associated areas 
15. 
 
To address the above challenges and needs, we draw from a 
systematic review of existing ICS security testbed work to 
identify relevant design factors that can provide guidance on 
security testbed development and use. We then propose a novel 
conceptual relationship map of credibility-supporting design 
factors (and their associated attributes) and a process 
implementation flow structure, for ICS security testbeds. The 
mapping structure and implementation process should not be 
construed as strictly sequential. The succession in the map using 
arrows is intended to show the relationships amongst design 
credibility factors and sub-attributes. Broadly, the relationship 
map can assist testbed developers and decision-makers in 
determining suitable design factors and approaches peculiar to 
their requirements. The process implementation flow can assist 
with a step-by-step guide on how the attributes in the map can 
be adopted towards a credible ICS testbed implementation. 
Together, both structures can support establishing and(or) 
enhancing the credibility of security-related ICS testbed work. 
The concepts proposed can also be applied to other security 
testbed development areas such as wireless sensors and 
computer networks. 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows; Section 
2 presents an overview of work related to ICS security testbed 
simulation. Section 3 describes our research methodology. 
Section 4 presents the results and analysis of fundamental design 
considerations identified in the study. Section 5 describes our 
proposed mapping structure and process for demonstrating ICS 
security testbed credibility. Section 6 concludes the work. 
 
2. Related Work 
The testbed publications reviewed considered those that are 
closely aligned to ICSs and/or cybersecurity including; the 
Internet of Things (IoT), cyber ranges, and Cyber Physical 
Production Systems (CPPS). 
 
Candell et al 2 detail three design/case study ICS testbeds 
with security scenario demonstrations. For the scenarios, design 
attributes are not structurally defined from the outset. Instead, 
design details on process descriptions, components, architecture, 
protocols, modelling approach, and security scenarios appear 
unstructured across the paper. This makes it difficult to easily 
and clearly recognise attributes that might come across as 
potential design requirements. In addition, the work has a 
limitation in that it fails to consider credibility-supporting 
factors such as `evaluation modes and outputs' which can be 
useful in building credible ICS designs/testbeds 16,17. Not 
considering evaluation modes demonstrates a lack of 
corroboration by parties other than the researchers/authors on 
the quality and credibility of testbeds or related work. Such work 
is felt to insufficiently support any claimed credibility by the 
authors. 
Gluhak et al 18 performed a technology-based review of IoT 
experimental testbeds. They focused on Wireless Sensor 
Networks (WSNs), and examined the effort required when 
migrating from WSNs to a global networked infrastructure of 
IoT. They evaluated existing IoT testbeds based on design 
challenges and functional characteristics including scalability, 
heterogeneity, repeatability, federation, concurrency, and 
mobility. These reflect characteristics considered valuable in 
contributing to testbed design credibility. 
Davis and Magrath 5 surveyed cyber ranges and computer 
network operations (CNO) testbeds from three broad 
classifications: Modelling and simulation, Ad-hoc or Overlay, 
and Emulations. One of the key conclusions is that simulation 
and emulation are the most common approaches for developing 
security testbeds due to a reduced cost of implementation, 
flexibility, scalability, and capacity for easy reconfiguration. 
In Siaterlis and Genge 19, a comparative study of nine ICS 
testbeds is presented. An analysis was conducted using a coarse 
scale (1-3) to rate six key operational characteristics: Fidelity, 
Repeatability, Measurement accuracy, Safety, Cost 
effectiveness and Multiple critical infrastructures, and two sub-
characteristics: Cyber and Physical. Besides failing to consider 
other crucial attributes like Scalability, Modularity, and 
Flexibility, the authors compared their work against others, but 
failed to provide any clear bench-marking requirements for the 
quality evaluations. 
Holm et al 20 surveyed 30 ICS testbeds proposed for 
scientific research. Most of the testbeds were designed for 
vulnerability analysis, test of defence mechanisms, and 
educational purposes. Pure simulation of ICS components 
appeared more common than virtualisation and hardware-based 
approaches. Testbed fidelity was heavily emphasised. However, 
factors like repeatability and safe execution were not well-
addressed by the surveyed testbed articles. 
In Salunkhe et al 21, a conceptual design of CPPS testbeds is 
presented, based on a review of prior testbeds. These were 
analysed based on their application sectors, i.e., electrical grid, 
cybersecurity, network and communications, robotics and 
manufacturing, IoT, Web and Cloud computing, simulation-
based, and others. Results showed cybersecurity to be the 
dominant area of interest. 
Design considerations for security testbeds is clearly a topic 
of interest across relevant communities and stakeholders. 
However, using relevant requirements as a means to address 
design credibility, and how this may be achieved, is currently 
absent in community discussions and literature. While attributes 
that can pass as design considerations and development factors 
have been discussed directly or implicitly in several work, they 
are fragmented. This restricts the ability to identify a broader set 
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of essential requirements or mappings to appropriate 
functionalities that can support the credibility of ICS security 
testbed designs and associated research activities. An outline of 
security testbed design essentials can help to streamline existing 
concepts and enable a pathway for suggesting a standardised 




We started by identifying relevant research contributions 
from related work, and then design factors from which attributes 
can be drawn. 
 
To provide a comprehensive view of the ICS security testbed 
space, we opted for a systematic review 22. This began with an 
unstructured survey involving online Google searches, applying 
related titles for a period covering 2008 to 2018. This was used 
to pick relevant keywords. These were then applied to a 
structured search in the SCOPUS and Web of Science databases 
for relevant articles (focusing on finding related keywords 
within each article's title, keywords, or abstract). Both databases 
were chosen because together they enable access to more 
resources with strength of a wider coverage and resource 
concurrency 23. Keywords used involved Boolean combinations 
of `ICS' OR `SCADA' AND `Security Testbeds' OR `Testbeds'. 
Finally, articles were selected if they contained text describing 
any variant of ICS security-related testbed design architectures, 
frameworks, or implementation, as research objectives, or as a 
tool for validating conducted research.  
 
A qualitative study was also made, involving a three-hour 
focus group workshop comprising 16 participants with ICS 
security modelling interests. These were drawn from academic, 
policy-making, and mixed-interest (i.e., combined interests in 
academia and policy-making) communities. Participants were 
asked to provide responses to specific questions. Inclusion 
criteria for participants was that they had experience or interests 
in designing, using, or regulating contexts related to ICSs 
M&Ss. 
 
Out of the 16 participants, four self-identified with policy-
making, six with academia, and six with mixed-interests. 
Answers were collected on boards using sticky notes for each 
interest group. The goal was to obtain a range of views and 
experiences from stakeholders on the significance of credibility 
in ICS security testbeds, especially from a research and 
development perspective. This was broken down into two 
precise questions: (i) Is credibility an issue in the development, 
use, and utility of security testbed models for ICS? If Yes, why? 
(ii) Design considerations that can build/strengthen credibility 
of ICS security simulation testbeds and the research that uses 
them. 
 
A thematic analysis method using Braun & Clarke’s six-
phase guide 24, was used to examine the data and to derive 
insights, as shown in Table 1. Data was collected from the sticky 
note responses of participant groups and analysed based on 
research questions following a top-down (theoretical) theme 
approach. This involved combining semantic and latent-level 
evaluations to identify more specific patterns in group 
responses, and exploring any underlying ideas and assumptions 
that may be associated with the themes. 
 
Table 1: Thematic Analysis Process 
Research 
Questions 






Made notes and jotted down 
early impressions on the 
value of credibility in ICS 
Research 
Questions 
Steps Context Description 
Is credibility an 
issue in the 
development, 
use, and utility 
of security 
testbed models 











testbeds and the 
research that 
use them. 
testbed M&Ss, and factors 
that can enhance credibility 





Coded data segments from 
written responses on post-it 
notes in order of relevance 




Examined codes and 
combined related codes into 




Revised and grouped 





Refined grouped themes and 
defined their essence and 
implication to study 
Step 6 Write-up 
Documented the results and 
interpretations based on 
research questions. 
 
4. Results  
From the systematic review, 77 articles were identified from 
the queried databases according to their match with applied 
search parameters. The relevance of each article was considered 
based on its title and abstract. Duplications were discarded. This 
left 41 articles found to contain substantial content on ICS 
security testbed use. These are presented Appendix A. Relevant 
design attributes that address ICS testbed design and security 
simulations were drawn from selected literature. The 
significance of identified attributes on credibility-building were 
also analysed comparatively with those obtained from thematic 
analysis of focus group responses. 
 
4.1 Credibility-Supporting Design Factors 
ICS security testbeds that can influence evidence-based 
decision-making on security policies and controls typically 
depend on the degree of conformity to real system that can be 
assured. This can influence confidence in the testbed to reliably 
satisfy a specific intended purpose 17.  
 
The composition of an ICS testbed model typically depends 
on the knowledge underpinning the testbed development, and 
the expertise of human experimenter to correctly define, design, 
integrate and configure testbed components, system and 
scenarios, documentation, evaluation and comprehension of the 
results of experimental security scenarios. Thus, the quality of 
an ICS security testbed and the confidence it can instil depends 
on the rigour of the operational theory underpinning the testbed, 
and the expertise in properly applying the theories to logical and 
convincing outcomes 25. However, the influence of expertise and 
knowledge in the credibility of security testbed M&S appears 
not to be well covered by existing research. This is despite that 
experimenters not only choose components that can integrate 
well into a model of a planned system, but also set-up and 
configure the components and process parameters, execute the 
processes, collect and analyse the results, and interpret 
outcomes. People involved in security testbed development have 
to make decisions including; the security contexts and features 
that are important to be modelled, the appropriate M&S 
approach to use, the components and scale to adopt, the core 
characteristics relevant to the contexts adopted, and the level of 
evaluation necessary to validate the model. They must have, and 
employ, the requisite knowledge and skills to logically 
implement the outlined processes. The lack of sufficient 
expertise in any areas may result in errors in those aspects of the 
testbed development. This can cause overall quality degradation 
and cast doubts as to the credibility of the testbed. 
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Design considerations that are useful are driven by well-
defined `usage objectives' 26. Because of the trade-off between 
obtaining highly representative systems and their 
implementation costs, testbed design considerations and 
decisions on simulation need to be driven by an intended use 27. 
‘Design Objectives’ have been cited as a relevant and a key 
context in testbed preparation, which needs to also align with 
design configurations 20. Design objectives and configurations 
need to be articulated well ahead to provide direction and scope 
for the development process, as well as to support functional 
validity and credibility. For simulation testbeds, applicable 
objectives need to be well clarified, since a design setup can be 
valid for one objective but not for another 14. 
 
The credibility of ICS security testbeds can also be 
influenced by their ‘Architecture Components’ 28,29. This refers 
to the common functionality coverage in an ICS setup 
comprising any combinations of the ICS functional areas; (i) 
Physical Process (PP), (ii) Field Devices (FD), (iii) 
Communications Gateway (CG), and (iv) Control Centre (CC) 
2,3. Component architecture also covers aspects of 
communications protocols; consisting of either IP routable 
and(or) IP non-routable protocols 2. Incorporating more aspects 
of the basic architecture components helps to clarify security 
issues related to specific components and their implications 
across the entire ICS network. A broader coverage of 
components within a common architecture can enable the 
simulation of wider contexts and enable better realism of an ICS 
from architectural perspectives. These can also support attaining 
a more holistic expression of security tests, and insights into the 
entire system impacts. They lend credence to the resulting 
testbed and the research that uses it. 
 
Testbed reliability can also be supported by demonstrating 
certain ‘Core Operational Characteristics’ 28,29 that underpin 
the structure and operation of a testbed. The core characteristics  
can take structural and functional dimensions 1,30. These 
comprise of behavioural attributes that are expressed in testbed 
operations such as the ability to; reflect the real nature of a 
system (fidelity), add or remove components or test scenarios 
(modularity), and log status of test scenarios (monitoring and 
logging). These also cover attributes that refer to testbed 
performance indicators. These include the ability to; easily use 
the testbed (usability), adapt it to new applications or scenarios 
(adaptability), and be open to improvements and modifications 
(scalability). These features are normally off-shoots of 
functional features 31. The relevance of these core operational 
characteristics in supporting testbed credibility has been 
acknowledged 1,20,30. Thus, demonstrating these attributes within 
a simulation testbed design adds some assurances that can 
advance trustworthiness and acceptability of the testbed and 
associated research. 
 
The ‘Simulation Approach’ adopted for a testbed also 
contributes to its perceived reliability 28,29. This refers to the 
structural and procedural formation of the components that 
constitute a simulation system testbed. Broadly, this can be 
classified into three: (i) Physical Simulation (PS) – involving 
purely real infrastructure components, (ii) Semi-Physical 
Simulations (SPS), sometimes called ‘Hardware in the Loop’ – 
involving a combination of real, emulated and/or virtualised 
abstractions of ICS components (i.e., a mix of Emulation and 
implementation-based approaches), and (iii) Software-based 
Simulations (SBS) – involving the simulation of components on 
a single, purely software platform. Other terms for these 
categories include real system (hardware and software), 
computer emulations or virtualisation (including hardware-in-
the-loop), pure software-based simulations 20 or live, virtual, and 
constructive (LVC) simulations 32,33.  
Real or live simulation involves actual/real world control 
system components operating on/with actual/real-world ICS set-
up and protocols. Despite using real components, this is 
considered a simulation because cyber-attack processes and 
scenarios are simulated, and not truly conducted against any live 
target adversary control system 33. An example includes using 
actual operators, actual network devices, actual components, 
and actual non-emulated/simulated software. Emulated or 
virtual simulation involves actual ICS components interacting 
with limited or representative ICS system models and vice versa.  
A ‘representative’ simulation model is one that offers the 
operationally relevant partial or complete interactive interfaces, 
protocols, and features of the actual component or system. A 
simulation model is said to be ‘limited’ if part of its components 
does not provide the relevant interactive interfaces, protocols, of 
the actual component. Examples include; having the emulators 
of components such as a PLC running on a virtual machine or 
replaying a logged real-life attack onto virtual or live systems. 
Pure software-based or constructive simulation approach 
involves the models of ‘limited’ or ‘representative’ components 
interacting with limited or representative system models. A 
typical example is simulating internet-scale traffic generation 
and background noise 33. 
The choice of M&S approach can be influenced by factors 
including; the experience or expertise of humans involved 34, the 
desired degree of representation or capability of an actual system 
35, the cost of development, and the budgeted development time 
28. In particular, the expertise of the human developer can affect 
how, and the degree of detail captured in a simulation testbed. 
Physical, real or live simulations typically enable the most 
representation of real system and data fidelity and is more likely 
to be credible than the other two approaches. 
 
An ICS testbed’s ‘Evaluation Process’ can also influence 
design quality and credibility 16. This refers to the procedures 
through which assessments are performed to determine how 
well a testbed’s design or related outputs are correct, and(or) 
acceptable. The purpose of testbed evaluation is to demonstrate 
with appropriate evidence that a testbed set-up and its scenario 
results fit the use intended, and do not present any intolerable 
risks. Having such evidential information in hand can support 
well-informed and confident decisions throughout a security 
M&S life cycle 12.  ICS testbed evaluation helps to clarify on the 
correctness of a testbed set-up, and its usefulness in addressing 
real-world industrial system needs. To build or enhance 
credibility, simulation testbeds, scenarios, data, and results all 
rely on suitable evaluation. This should demonstrate fulfilment 
of relevant reliability factors including design objectives, 
structural, behavioural, and performance characteristics in line 
with intended use. Such evidence can exist in varied degrees, 
supporting a scale of credibility and acceptance. While 
evaluation proofs may be offered by testbed authors, they may 
be better accepted when coming from other sources, e.g., 
independent reviewers. However, the best evidences of 
credibility are likely to come from public institutions, 
standardisation or certification bodies such as National Institute 
of Standards and Technology (NIST), the UK’s National 
Physical Laboratory (NPL) and The Institute of Engineering and 
Technology (IET).  
The three contexts of testbed M&S evaluation described can 
be more technically termed as: verification, validation, and 
accreditation 36. Verification describes the process of clarifying 
that an ICS testbed model implementation and its associated data 
correctly represent the developer's specifications. Validation 
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defines the process of determining the degree to which an ICS 
testbed model and its associated data provide a correct 
representation of the real-world ICS system from the perspective 
of the intended uses of the testbed. Accreditation  describes the 
official certification that a testbed simulation model or a 
federation of testbed and its associated data is acceptable for use 
for a specific purpose 37. Each of the evaluation category seeks 
to answer a unique question that captures a specific testbed 
simulation idea. Verification answers; Was the testbed built 
right? Validation answers; Was the right testbed built? 
Accreditation answers; Is the built testbed believable enough to 
be used?  That an evaluation process can transition from 
verification to validation and then to accreditation reflects an 
incremental appraisal process, whose results can provide 
stronger evidence(s) and ground(s) to persuade confidence, 
belief, trustworthiness, and acceptability of the testbed 
simulation outputs.  
 
Arguably, persuading credibility in ICS security testbeds and 
associated research can involve demonstrating that component 
setups, functional and application approaches, experimental 
processes and results are clear and sound. Typically, these 
include maintaining a set of associated documentation including 
records demonstrating that testbed systems conform to design 
goals, architecture components, functionality set-ups and 
applications, experimental scenarios and measurement 
outcomes, and evaluation procedures, as applicable in a real-
world context. The broad set of documentation should cover 
context breakdowns of testbed process descriptions including 
process model schematics, protocols, logical architectures 
(zones and enclaves), physical architectures, control strategies 
and parameters, module and component descriptions, assembly 
details, measurement data collections, evaluation metrics 
(security and operational). Relevant testbed details need to also 
include the security requirement descriptions following 
prescribed or guiding security standard, such as the standard 
series of ISA99, Industrial Automation and Control System 
Security 38, or similar contexts in NIST 800-82 4, and NIST 
Advanced Manufacturing series 200-1 39. The intention is to help 
users/experimenters become familiar with the technologies, test 
and evaluation processes involved, and to serve as reference 
manual. Indicating the qualification and expertise of the human 
experimenter can support confidence and acceptance in the 
associated research and its outputs. This can also contribute to 
improved rigour in supporting decision makers’ assessments. 
 
4.2. Quantitative Review of Literature 
 This section presents a quantitative   analysis of the literature 
on credibility factors in ICS testbed research. In analysing the 
semantic description of security design objectives, eight broad 
themes have emerged. These include: Threat Analysis, 
Vulnerability Analysis, Attack Analysis, Impact Analysis, 
Defence Mechanism Test/Analysis, Education and Training, 
Creation of Policies and(or) Standards, and 
Performance/Quality of Service Analysis. Their occurrence 
across the reviewed work is summarised in Table 2. ‘Attack 
Analysis’ (63.41%) and ‘Defence Mechanism Tests/Analysis’ 
(56.1%) are the two most common objectives for designing and 
using ICS security testbeds for research. Other dominant design 
objectives for ICS security testbeds include: Impact Analysis, 
Vulnerability Analysis, and Education & Training.  
Again, from Table 2, analysis of the adoption of simulation 
approaches showed that 21.95% of studied work combined 
Software-based and Semi-physical (emulation, virtualisation, or 
HIL) to realise the desired ICS security testbeds systems, 
processes, and tests. 19.51% combined elements of all three 
methods (i.e., SBS + SPS + PS), and 12.20% combined Semi-
physical (emulation, virtualisation, or HIL) with Physical 
(Hardware or Software) methods. Fewer works were exclusive 
in their methods with 17.07% each supporting purely physical 
simulations and purely software-based approach. 12.20% used a 
form of Semi-physical method – involving either emulation, 
virtualisation, or HIL techniques, and often only simulated just 
a part of the ICS architecture, rather than the complete setup or 
components.  
 
For architecture components coverage, results in Table 3 
show that nearly half of the reviewed research defined and(or) 
adopted design component structures that covered all four broad 
functional areas of ICS described earlier. Between 3 and 11 
works covered three function areas, and on average 2 works 
covered two function areas. CGs appear to be the function area 
most explored, with a coverage of 95.12%. This is followed by 
CC components (90.24%) and PP components (82.93%). 
 
For core characteristics, a total of fourteen distinct key 
operational characteristics were found across the projects as 
shown in Table 2. 70.7% of the reviewed work contained 
statements and descriptions that related to one or more of the 
fourteen core characteristics. Researchers more commonly 
focused on fidelity (41.46%) than the other characteristics. 
There were 26.83% references to scalability/extensibility, 8 
instances each (19.51% each) of references to 
flexibility/adaptability, and repeatability/reproducibility 
characteristics, with the remaining characteristics having fewer 
results. 
 
Concerning evaluation processes, results in Table 4 show 
that more than half (56.10%) of the reviewed projects lacked 
information relating to any form of evaluation to verify, validate 
or accredit their works. 19.51% mentioned evaluation 
approaches that relate to design/scenario comparisons against 
common standards and reference model documentation, which 
may imply a validation process by independent parties. 
Examples of standards referenced include: NIST SP 800-82 R2 
4, PERA Reference Model 40, and IEC 60870-5-104 TCP/IP 
Communications 41. 14.63% of works used a verification 
approach – showing at completion that their works satisfied 
prescribed design objectives. No work demonstrated any form 
of accreditation, neither did any project demonstrate evaluation 
to a level suitable for accreditation.  
 
Table 2: Analysis of ICS Security-Related Design Objectives 
 Design/Simulation Objectives 
(Security-Centric) 
Percent of Total 
(%) 
Attack Analysis 63.41 
Defence Mechanism Tests/Analysis 56.10 
Impact Analysis 41.46 
Vulnerability Analysis 36.59 
Education and Training 24.39 
Threat Analysis 9.76 
Performance/QoS Analysis 2.44 
Creation of Policies and(or) Standards 2.44 
  
Design/Simulation Approach:                              
Percent of Total 
(%) 
SBS + SPS 21.95 
SBS + SPS + PS 19.51 
PS  17.07 
SBS 17.07 
SPS + PS 12.20 
SPS 12.20 
Key to notations: 
-  Software-Based Simulation = SBS,  
- Semi-Physical Simulation (Emulation or /Virtualisation / HIL) = SPS,  
- Physical Simulation = PS,  
‘+’ used to reflect combination of approaches. 
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Table 3: Analysis of Architectural Component Simulation Coverage 
Design/Simulation Coverage:                              
Percent of Total 
(%) 
CC + CG + PP + FD 46.34 
CC + CG + PP 26.83 
PP + CG + FD 9.76 
CC + CG + FD 7.32 
CC + FD 4.88 
CC + CG 4.88 
Characteristics  
Percent of Total 
(%) 
Fidelity 41.46 
Scalability or Extensibility 26.83 
Flexibility or Adaptability 19.51 
Reproducibility or Repeatability 19.51 
Modularity 17.07 
Cost-Effectiveness 9.76 
Measurability & Measurement Accuracy 9.76 




Monitoring & Logging 2.44 
Openness 2.44 
Complexity 2.44 
Key to notations: 
- Communications Gateway = CG  
- Physical Process = PP 
- Control Centre = CC 
- Field Device/Components = FD 
‘+’ used to reflect combination of component classes covered. 
 






- Not Mentioned 56.10 
Verification User-defined Requirements 14.63 
Validation 
Standards and Reference Model 19.51 
Prior Works 4.88 
Real ICS 2.44 
- Unreferenced Architecture 2.44 
 
4.3 Qualitative Analysis of Participant Workshop 
This section presents the results of thematic analysis of the 
responses and feedback from the focus group workshop. 
 
For the first questions (RQ1) on whether credibility is an 
issue in the development, use, and utility of security testbed 
models for ICS, we find the responses from participants to be 
unanimously affirmative. There is common agreement that 
demonstrating credibility is crucial in ICS security testbed-
related work. It was common view that clear guidelines on how 
credibility may be built in ICS security M&S are currently 
lacking, and not being emphasised enough to command attention 
and response of testbed security experiment developers  
 
To support the opinion for the importance of demonstrating 
credibility in the development, use, and utility of security testbed 
models for ICS, participants identified “building or enhancing 
trust”, and “supporting real-world applications” as key drivers 
for engagement. There is a need to trust and accept as reliable, 
the design, structure and process implementations of an ICS 
security testbed, the research that uses it, and any associated 
results. Being able to depend on the testbed to demonstrate the 
functionalities and processes expected in real system domains is 
also vital. 
The capacity to ‘enable analysis’ also resonated as a 
common theme that was emphasised during focus group 
discussions. Analysis dimensions highlighted in this regard 
include: “behavioural impact analysis”, “accident impact 
analysis”, and “modular-based analysis”. These highlight 
capability benefits that can be gained from using ICS testbeds 
for security analysis. Thus, the criticality of ICSs to societal 
function makes for the need to ensure a significant degree of 
certainty and accuracy about any analysis context engaged. The 
mentioned analysis dimensions can also pass as potential design 
objectives for a security testbed and were found useful to support 
the context being studied. 
 
On the second question (RQ2) on the design considerations 
that can build/strengthen the credibility of ICS security 
simulation testbeds and the research that use them, disparate 
feedbacks were aggregated from the three stakeholder 
categories. Policy Makers identified available institutional 
resource capability (cash and skills), demonstrating a 
shared/cascaded development responsibility, design 
interoperability and flexibility. Interoperability resonated in the 
points from the academic group alongside ‘demonstrating 
object-oriented scenario setup’, ‘capturing system layer-based 
simulation’, and ‘ability to simulate automated load, failure 
handling, and decision-making’. The Mixed Interest group also 
acknowledge the importance of experts (knowledge and skills) 
along with an ability to replicate real world scenarios. 
 
The responses from participants were aggregated and 
harmonised into similar themes following the analysis steps 
outlined in Table 1. The resulting common themes expressed 
attributes related to testbed M&S design, process, structure, 
organisation, application, and capability. For example, 
responses like “capturing system layer-based simulation”, 
“including computational infrastructure”, and “including 
object-oriented scenario setup” related to design factors. 
Concerning capability factors, one response read “expert 
opinion is important”. Responses related to structural factors 
include: design “flexibility”, “design interoperability”, and 
“design fidelity”.  
 
5. Discussion on Enabling Credibility Factors in ICS 
Security Testbeds 
It is found from the combined review of existing work that 
the following factors contribute to the trustworthiness of ICS 
security testbeds and(or) associated research: (i) clearly defined 
security-related design objectives and security scenarios, (ii) the 
type(s) of simulation approach(es) and the degree of abstractions 
involved, (iii) the scope of architecture components covered, (iv) 
the reflection of core characteristics, and (v) the testbed 
evaluation methods. The recurrence of these attributes in 
literature gives an idea of their relevance too. 
 
For most of the ICS testbed work studied, not involving 
evaluation to a level that can support accreditation supports the 
argument that insufficient emphasis has been given to the 
significance of building credibility.  The lack of a form of 
evaluation characterises works in this area, which is probably 
influenced by the widespread lack of emphasis in existing 
standards and best practice guidelines. It seems that researchers 
and experts do not perceive the need to address such contexts 
and attributes in their work as necessities to demonstrating 
quality and stimulating acceptance.  
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This leaves experimenters short in addressing open questions 
on how to prove that associated testbeds produce claimed 
objective parameters and/or valid results, without showing how 
the verification and/or validation was achieved. Often, since 
these concerns do not appear to be raised publicly or by industry 
bodies, they are often swept aside or ignored. Although testbeds 
tend to have more documentation that serves as a reference guide 
enabling users to familiarise themselves with the technologies, 
understanding key contexts that support credibility is crucial to 
guide researchers and experimenters, since typically user 
documentation is not of a standard fit for publication. This is 
perhaps a limitation of existing work, which exposes researchers 
to the risks of missing valuable information that could underpin 
credible designs and experiments, particularly those that 
contribute to repeatability and measurability. A possible 
solution lies in identifying the factors that are most important to 
specific sectors and/or applications. This should be explored 
while considering the trade-off between specificity and 
generality of a testbed’s purpose and following a structured 
approach in selecting and implementing attributes that can 
inform the credibility of the setup and/or associated research. 
 
Thematic analysis suggests a strong emphasis on impact, 
evidenced by authors' concerns and focus on demonstrating and 
learning from negative impacts before they happen, and the 
quest to achieve resilience. Losses that arise from compromising 
impacts and the need to reduce or completely avoid system 
consequences is an associated reason for emphasis. Although 
significant, these contexts represent just one out of the range of 
potential design objectives or benefits of the testbed security 
modelling approach. 
 
There are overlapping views between the themes and codes 
in thematic analysis and the factors identified from systematic 
study. Although the terms used to describe contexts appear to 
vary in both views, the semantics point in a similar direction. 
Results from the time-constrained focus group are not as 
detailed and encompassing as those from the systematic study. 
However, the data available still demonstrate common ideas. 
For example, response codes under capability factors can be 
linked to human expertise in knowledge and skills. Indeed, the 
opinion of experts depends on their knowledge and skills in the 
context considered. This can in turn affect the potential 
credibility level. Responses under design factors can be related 
to both testbed design objectives, while combining the responses 
under design, process, and organisational factors point to 
architectural design attributes. Responses under structural 
factors can link to core operational characteristics. Thus, there 
is a degree of coherence between the two perspectives 
concerning the perceived factors that contribute to building or 
enhancing credibility in ICS testbed security modelling. 
 
5.1 Mapping Credibility Characteristics to Security 
Testbed Configurations 
Figure 1: Mapping Structure for ICS Testbed Credibility Demonstration 
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We have developed a mapping structure that outlines the 
relationships between testbed design factors and show how the 
identified design factors co-relate to support credibility. As 
shown in Figure 1, considering these elements and features 
together can greatly support building a compelling story about 
ICS security testbed design, setup, and its use and utility for 
security analysis. Such a narrative can provide a wider 
understanding of an ICS testbed’s composition, functionalities, 
abstraction, simplifications, assumptions (where available) and 
test/experimental results, underlining the need for a reliable 
representation of the real system being modelled or analysed. 
 
 
i) Human Knowledge and Expertise 
Clearly, the degree of knowledge and expertise available to 
the experimenters influences the quality of decisions made 
concerning the realisation of a security testbed, spanning 
defining design objectives through to evaluating their 
implementation. 
 
Resource requirements for security testbed M&S, e.g. 
experimentation time, budget, and available technology 
infrastructure, can also influence the parameters of choice, and 
the level of fidelity achievable. These requirements make it 
difficult to achieve a generic testbed setup for a span of skills 
categories, especially for low-skilled users. Documentation that 
clarifies the context and appropriate level of user expertise can 
inform confidence in, and the reliability of inferences drawn 
from experiments. The likelihood is that testbed research from 
more experienced researchers will potentially provide more 
depth of analysis and give great confidence in reliability. 
 
The knowledge and experience of testbed developers/users 
can help to identify core characteristics that need to be captured 
in specific testbed modelling contexts and scenarios. Once 
identified, these core characteristics can help guide the 
characterisation of design objectives and define a range of 
scenarios to explore. Consequently, relevant metrics and 
measurement approaches can also be determined. Expertise also 
informs the appropriate design architecture, components, and 
simulation methods (including associated sub-attributes). The 
knowledge and experience of experimenters also contributes to 
the level of evaluation that can be undertaken. 
 
As a minimum, modern ICS Security testbed experimenters 
require expertise in both ICS and IT systems development, 
together with an ability to: adopt appropriate modelling 
approach, techniques and tools, configure test applications, 
execute test scenarios, collect and interpret results. These steps 
require experience as they are susceptible to errors arising from 
insufficient knowledge and skills. One way is to engage external 
professional expertise in areas where researchers have limited 
experience and aptitude, by employing experts in ICS 
technology development to handle ICS operations design and 
implementation, while security researchers focus on the 
security-related experimentation. 
 
ii) Core characteristics (Structural and Functional) 
We believe that the core characteristics outlined are 
important as they individually contribute to measures that help 
establish or advance credibility. It seems that there are 
characteristics that contribute more than others to overall 
credibility. The ranking of importance varies across 
functionalities and application domains, and often based on 
targeted objectives. However, results from analysis and 
occurrence frequencies of characteristics can provide 
suggestions on how the relevance of these characteristics is 
viewed by the security simulation design community. The 
number also provides a way of potentially ranking 
characteristics. For example, the requirement for demonstrating 
the fidelity of a simulation testbed and/or its use seem of greatest 
significance. This is apparently followed (in order) by 
scalability (extensibility), flexibility (adaptability or 
controllability), repeatability (reproducibility), modularity, 
measurability/measurement accuracy, cost-effectiveness, safe 
execution/isolation, diversity, and usability. To build credibility, 
it is important for ICS testbed system and associated research to 
consider and demonstrate these characteristics. Evidencing as 
many as possible of these characteristics improves the 
confidence of decision-makers and other stakeholders to 
consider and accept the results of testbed designs, thereby 
improving their value.  
 
Fidelity refers to the degree of correlation between security 
simulation or test predictions and real world observations 
15,20,42,43. It quantifies the degree of representativeness between a 
testbed setup and an actual system, in terms of tools (hardware 
and software technologies), functionalities and tasks. The degree 
of fidelity can typically be determined by the simulation 
approach adopted – either software-based simulation (SBS), 
semi-physical simulation (SPS), physical simulation (PS), or 
combinations of these. Physical simulation is typically 
considered to have the highest fidelity while purely software-
based simulations, the least 32. 
 
Scalability or Extensibility refers to the characteristic to 
grow the size of a testbed setup (network) and functionality 
15,32,44. This can be demonstrated by the ability to add or migrate 
components (e.g., sensors & actuators) to existing operational 
testbed subsystems, thereby increasing capabilities or 
functionality without significant re-organisation or re-design. 
Examples of how this may be achieved are demonstrated thus; 
for software-based simulation approaches using SciLab 
simulators to add Field Devices; for semi-physical simulation 
techniques using Virtual Machines to emulate Control Centre 
components; and for physical simulations – using real 
subsystems such PLCs as Field Devices 15,43. 
 
Flexibility or Adaptability describes the ability to easily and 
swiftly re-define and repurpose a simulation system and setup 
for alternative use cases 3,32,45. It can also be viewed as 
‘controllability’ – emphasising the ability and extent to enable 
the control of environment variables. This can be theoretically 
expressed in design/simulation objectives and practically 
demonstrated in design/simulation architecture. For example, an 
ability to show that a simulation system initially purposed for 
security vulnerability analysis can be easily re-structured to 
perform security impact analysis. 
 
Repeatability or Reproducibility refers to the characteristic 
whereby similar outputs/outcomes are obtained from identically 
replicated designs/testbed setups. Exact copies of designs and 
testbed setups or security test scenarios should produce identical 
or statistically consistent results 20,46. One way this characteristic 
can be obtained is through full documentation of design and 
process configurations, as well as security scenarios 15,43,46. 
Other researchers can thereby obtain consistent results by 
applying the same configurations to directly recreate and test 
scenarios. 
 
Modularity describes a design capability that allows easy 
adaption to changing requirements, including complexities and 
flexibility in industrial operations 44,47,48. It involves developing 
ICS testbed structures that can accommodate continuous 
improvements. It is typified by a design that can accommodate 
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real components, emulated nodes, and network simulators (data 
traffic) such as the OPNET modeller, which can enable a typical 
system-in-the-loop (SITL) capability 49–51. Such design concepts 
and provisions can improve system understanding, reduce 
complexity, increase flexibility, and facilitate the reuse of 
components 52. Implementing modularity can provide a 
structured approach and an action path that realises, through 
validated module re-use, incremental credibility of a security 
simulation testbed with respect to environment, data, and results.  
 
Cost-effectiveness is a property that relates to achieving 
testbed design objectives and scenarios within financial budgets 
that are affordable for research purposes 20,53. The emphasis is 
on using smaller budgets/costs (in comparison to actual system 
costs) to achieve the same design objectives and scenarios 
(including architectural setups and configurations) as the real. 
This can be achieved through setups that simulate numerous 
components and services consolidated into a single portable 
testbed system 51. For example, using virtual machines and other 
virtual infrastructures to emulate control workstations, servers 
and other ICS components 51,54, which can result in a cost-
efficient alternative to using real and proprietary hardware 
workstation and server systems. This is typically subjective and 
varies across projects, depending on budgetary availabilities and 
research/test requirements. Often, a trade-off and balance is 
required between the cost of constructing testbeds and the 
fidelity of the system, and the decision that needs to be informed 
53. 
 
Measurability and Measurement accuracy describes the 
ability to ensure that the process of testing or replicating cyber 
security scenarios via testbeds can be quantified, and that such 
measurements do not interfere with corresponding outputs 20,42. 
This can be demonstrated by including tools (e.g. sensors) or 
features for verifying attributes like traffic flows and response 
times amongst components. The capability to show and 
document data and values associated with these features also 
needs to be demonstrated 19,53 typically at the documentation 
stages of an evaluation procedure (e.g. verification). 
 
Safe execution or Isolation of tests describes a characteristic 
that ensures cyber security scenarios and activities are 
performed in a secure and isolated approach and environment, 
such that they do not increase risk or impact safety in the real 
environment 55. This can easily be demonstrated using network 
segmentation approaches 56 to separate plant networks from 
enterprise networks and processes. The use of access control 
policies at various network layers is another approach typically 
implemented at communication gateway components such as 
access point devices 55. 
 
Usability refers to the ability for a testbed to be readily 
employed by reasonably skilled operators, with little likelihood 
of simulation misuse 20,32. This is essential to cope with different 
skill sets of potential users. Usability can be demonstrated 
through adopting design and developing structures using 
components that enable friendly user interfaces 57. For example, 
using virtualisation and VLANs to enable the easy integration of 
testbed components in the CG section of ICS architectures 15,43. 
 
Diversity refers to the ability of an ICS testbed to incorporate 
a varied range of components without undermining the capacity 
for scalability as discussed earlier. An effective testbed need to 
be able to mirror a variety of ICS setups 15,43,58. This includes 
demonstrating where feasible and necessary; market-driven 
heterogeneity in components (vendor products e.g., Siemens, 
Allen Bradley, Schneider), protocols (e.g., TCP, UDP, OPC, 
Modbus/TCP, DNP3, EthernetIP) and processes (e.g., 
manufacturing, assembly, traffic control, water treatment) 
employed in a testbed setup. This can provide valuable ICS 
security insights from legacy, contemporary, and future 
outlooks, and deployments that reflect industrial practices, 
enabling a variety of experimental setups and scenarios. These 
can help advance system credibility for practical applications 3. 
 
Interoperability refers to the ability of combinations of SBS, 
SPS, and PS testbed simulation components to interface, 
communicate, exchange and use information to achieve desired 
objectives. This can typically be demonstrated in the 
development of hybrid ICS testbeds and security experiments 
involving PS components such as Control workstations that 
connect to IED interfaced with SPS techniques like virtual 
machine servers and virtual communication components 51. 
 
Monitoring & Logging describes the ability to observe and 
record process execution and to optimise event logging for 
security purposes 15,43. One way of achieving this is through 
implementing a measurement enclave with Syslog tools and 
traffic monitoring systems to keep track of operational activities 
3. This can be better achieved through automated granular data 
flows – understanding data sources and pathways to help resolve 
undesirable impacts on process functionality 59. 
 
Complexity and Openness describe two related attributes 
identified as valuable in modern ICS testbed designs. Openness 
defines the capability of a testbed simulation setup to support 
remote access or data openness 15,43. While complexity ensures 
that architectures are represented in a transparent manner such 
that a single point of data access or extraction can be enabled 
from different network zones or segments of the ICS 15,43,58. 
 
As shown in Figure 3, the mapping can be quite complex 
with a range of one-to-many connections that may not be clear 
at first glance. Contextual description may be needed to clarify 
the specific attributes involved as presented in section 5.1. Most 
(14 arrows) of the characteristics appear to map to the 
‘simulation design architecture’ factor and associated attributes, 
compared with ‘design objectives’ and ‘testbed evaluation 
process’ which had fewer (7 and 3 arrows respectively) 
mappings. This suggests that the most significant task and 
proportion of effort for establishing credibility in ICS security 
testbeds and associated research lies in simulation design 
architecture. This is exemplified by the simulation approach 
adopted and the design components and functionalities 
(hardware and software) employed. The design architecture 
needs to be carefully considered to ensure capture of the 
necessary credibility-supporting characteristics and backed with 
sufficient evaluation processes to maximise system 
trustworthiness as being representative of the real world. 
 
iii) Design Objectives    
Design objectives are a vital consideration as pointed out in 
4.1, since ICS security testbed design architecture, attributes and 
decisions must be driven by usage intentions. A majority of ICS 
security-related research activities seem to focus on 
investigating cyber-attack feasibilities, the capability of security 
controls and defence mechanisms, and the analysis of attack 
impacts, instanced by successful attacks or failed security 
controls. 
 
However, it is also important to understand the existence and 
nature of vulnerabilities in industrial control systems and 
components. Often this builds on the assumption that 
vulnerabilities nearly always exist in ICSs, since they are by 
default presumed to lack security. This means that 
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experimenters typically focus on understanding random attack 
modes, often through penetration testing, and on ascertaining 
robustness against specific attacks given certain security 
measures applied. Along these ideas, there is a risk of losing 
sight of the susceptibilities that may emerge due to system 
complexity, interdependencies, and cascading impacts. Yet 
these are the types of insights that are needed to support better 
security decision-making, and that should be considered in 
emerging and future testbed security analysis work. Formulating 
system-level and organisational security policies and standards 
is another security testbed design priority that requires more 
attention in order to re-focus the technical community – from 
attributing greater relevance to tasks related to establishing 
security than those of security governance and standardisation. 
 
In addition, clearly defining testbed design objectives serves 
to resolve the typical tension between the high cost of deploying 
security testbed components, and the degree of similitude to the 
real system. For example, a testbed to determine vulnerabilities 
in ICS sub-systems like PLCs may not require the significant 
implementation and representation effort of an entire industrial 
architecture set-up, which can be expensive and unnecessary. 
Model approaches that involve combining the target 
component/module with virtual/software-based components can 
also be considered. Both measures can significantly reduce the 
cost of testbed development. Articulating specific high-level 
security-related design objective(s) well ahead of 
implementation can help with the decisions related to the control 
choice(s) to be made. For example, Fovino et al 56 described the 
analysis of cyber-attacks and impacts as objectives for their 
testbed-related security study. They further narrowed these 
objectives to encompass “SCADA system phishing with DNS 
poisoning, DoS Worm, and Modbus/DNP3 protocol worm”. 
Similarly, Bergman et al 55 described their objective to aim at 
supporting the analysis of security control and impact. They 
clarified this further by indicating that in the context of the 
objective mentioned, their work explored “testing the impacts of 
network segmentation and SSL encryption using OpenVPN”. 
Providing this level of specificity proved necessary to support a 
clearer understanding of what the work entailed in scope and 
design.   
 
iv) Simulation Approach 
For the simulation approach, all three schemas – real/live, 
emulated/virtual, and software-based/constructive, appear to 
have significant support in the user community. However, 
combining multiple simulation approaches seems more popular 
than using each alone. Besides aiming for a greater similitude to 
real system, another motivation involves exploring 
combinations that enable one approach to cover for the 
limitations of another. Often, the choice of method(s) to 
combine is influenced by the degree of fidelity desired, the cost 
and affordability of development involved, and the time 
available for testbed development. The requirement for 
researcher/user expertise is a cross-cutting theme. Achieving 
high realism involves using infrastructures that work in the real 
environment; these are often expensive. Also, longer periods 
may be required to complete set-ups and configure the system 
and test processes. Often, decisions need to be weighted by 
trade-offs between attributes based on the defined objectives. 
 
v) Architecture Components 
From results, the coverage of communication gateway (CG) 
components seems to dominate other architecture functional 
groups. This may be due to the mature nature of research and 
development in digital system/network communications 
gateway infrastructure, which increases its popularity over other 
functionality groups. The coverage frequency of component 
classes may also be driven by the degree of class criticality in 
testbed considerations.  
 
Often, a broader coverage of functional areas, component 
classes and applicable routing protocols in a testbed architecture 
can depend on the objective(s) and scope of desired test 
scenario(s). Recapping the earlier scenario of assessing the 
vulnerabilities of a single FD device, this is unlikely to require 
building an entire SCADA system network but could involve a 
more direct approach of executing security audits on the desired 
device without necessarily embedding it in an operational ICS 
network. The hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) approach is a good 
technique to use. Another example involves structures that 
include CG components such as routers and switches where 
routable protocols are required. However, when tests do not 
involve the flow of data over router-based sub-systems and 
connections, then non-routable networks and protocols are 
appropriate. It may be safer to consider routable protocols (e.g., 
Modbus TCP and DNP3) in ICS security testbed designs since 
they are by design better adapted to secure configuration across 
network paths than the non-routable protocols (e.g., DeviceNet), 
which are better placed to handle perimeter-based security. 
Notwithstanding the choice, incorporating all four functionality 
classes into an ICS security testbed design can allow for wider 
contexts to be mirrored, which typically provides a better 




vi) Design Evaluation Process 
The existence and rigour of evaluation process affects the 
credibility of ICS security simulation testbeds. The three levels 
of evaluation – verification, validation, and accreditation 
(VV&A) – indicate the possibility of a scale of credibility.  
  
 Verification enables project experimenters to double-check 
that adopted/defined security design/simulation requirement(s), 
system functions and processes, and any associated data, 
correctly represent the experimenter's conceptual description 
and specifications. It spans a range of contexts such as; (i) 
verifying testbed structure and defined objectives – justifying 
that testbed attributes are identified and usage objectives are 
clearly defined with sufficient accuracy, (ii) verifying design 
problems – proving that the problem adopted contains the actual 
environment problem, and is sufficiently well-formed to allow 
sufficiently credible solutions to be obtained, (iii) verifying 
functions – activities that demonstrate that testbed system 
functions and operations accurately mirror known real system 
behaviours relative to defined objectives, (iv) verifying solutions 
– activities demonstrating that the outputs and results reflect the 
known outcomes in real systems subject to the same parameters 
and operational conditions 25. Verification is performed by the 
security testbed experimenters – a way of self-corroboration – to 
support credibility by demonstrating that predefined 
requirements in design, functionality, and outputs are well-
satisfied. Techniques that can be applied for this can include: 
Desk checking, model review, result analysis, instrumentation-
based testing, functionality testing, and sensitivity analysis 60.  
  
 Validation often comes from parties non-affiliated to the 
context being validated and seeks to establish the extent to which 
an ICS security testbed and associated data, mirror the real-
world intended use scenario. Typically, it may involve the work 
of third-parties in repeating processes and methodologies of 
verification, to ensure agreement between the observed or 
known behaviour of real system components and processes with 
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that of the testbed simulation system. It also includes 
ascertaining whether any difference between the two are 
acceptable given the testbed’s intended use. This crucially helps 
to timely identify and rectify issues and avoid unnecessary 
misuse of evaluation time and other resources by users. 
Validation can be done using different methods, including based 
on historical data, through comparison with other testbed 
simulators,  from expert judgements, parameter sensitivity 
analysis, or predictions 61.  
  
 Accreditation aims to certify that a testbed set-up and/or 
associated data are acceptable for a defined purpose. An 
accreditation evaluation leads to a recommendation that a 
certifying official or body authorises that a specific testbed M&S 
set-up or tool can be used for the purpose it is designed 62. Thus, 
an accreditation often relies on the evidence(s) from verification 
and validation, and from additional in-depth and multi-level 
evaluations to establish more concrete attestation by an official 
certification body (typically government-based) following an 
independent assessment. In testbed model accreditation, the 
acceptability criteria are identified well ahead, and then the 
evidential knowledge from verification and validation processes 
is applied to ascertain how the intended use of the testbed model 
is impacted 63. This way, accreditation not only focuses on the 
intended use, but also on the requirements for adopting testbed 
models. 
 
 Not all testbed M&S structures require an evaluation to 
accreditation level, so this should be pursued only if necessary.  
We believe that the level of evaluation necessary to support 
credibility and adoption can depend on factors such as project 
costs, available time and resources. In a resource-constrained 
setting, the cost of an evaluation process that involves VV&A 
activities on ICS security testbeds M&S can be prohibitively 
high compared to what is available or affordable. The 
unavailability of appropriate reference data, information from 
development products, documentation of past evaluations, can 
increase evaluation costs. Thus, it is advisable that the extent to 
which evaluation investments are made be weighed against 
potential risks of reaching; weak conviction, a bad decision, and 
huge scale of adverse impact; stemming from unreliable testbed 
M&S results or uncertainty in the evaluation process and life 
cycle. For example, although accreditation can afford greater 
credibility, it can take longer, and extend project schedules to 
achieve the in-depth documentation and assessments that may 
be required by certification bodies. This can be costly to achieve 
and may be less of an issue in the case of validations or 
verification – with the possible consequence of impacting 
perceived credibility of relevant testbeds or related work.  
 
 Unarguably, it is beneficial to pursue transitioning from 
verification to validation, and finally accreditation, as this 
provides a stronger evidence base and grounding for credibility. 
However, testbed developers and decision-makers responsible 
for evaluation investments need to consider risk possibilities 
related to defects in testbed set-ups, simulation scenarios and 
processes, hardware components, software elements, data, or 
even misjudged testbed capabilities by users. The level of 
tolerance considered acceptable should be part of the 
determining factors for the level of evaluation to reach. 
 
5.2 Credibility-building Process 
 
Besides understanding the crucial design factors that can 
help to improve credibility of testbed simulation systems and 
their relationship as shown in Figure 1, it is crucial to adopt a 
structured approach in applying the factors into design 
implementation processes. The process can guide ICS security 
testbed experimenters on the steps to follow in their M&S 
process to persuade confidence and acceptability. This is shown 
in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2: ICS Testbed Credibility-building Process 
 The first step in the credibility-building process should start 
with human expertise. Typically, based on the expertise of the 
developers involved, it is essential to have a testbed 
development plan – covering aspects of ICS and the IT and how 
they are integrated. Expertise in these areas could be 
demonstrated and inferred from the quality of context, design 
setup, and descriptions provided, which should reflect the real 
system. Testbed security design and simulation objectives need 
to be clearly defined and described in context to set the target 
scope.  
 The second step in the process involves defining the security 
design objective of interest. This should describe in clear context 
the security purposes for which the testbed design and scenarios 
are being implemented. The objectives can be singular, or a 
range of target security capacities or intents that could be 
achieved with the design. Expert knowledge and skills, coupled 
with clearly defined design/simulation objectives, contribute to 
defining an appropriate architecture.  
 The third step involves defining the design/simulation 
architecture. The architecture will encompass hardware, 
software, and protocol components and sub-systems. It also 
includes the simulation approach adopted, or any combinations 
thereof which are relevant for the intended test strategy and 
cope. These are aimed at persuading a high degree of 
confidence, trustworthiness acceptance of outcomes – 
credibility, as shown in Figure 1.  
 The fourth steps involve identifying and demonstrating core 
design/simulation characteristics that have been deemed 
relevant and considering any trade-offs. This gives better idea 
on the context and scope of security modelling and simulation 
adopted. 
 Once initial design and security test(s) have been completed, 
it is crucial to engage a final step of evaluating security scenario 
outcomes against initial characteristics intended in the plan. 
Evaluation must also include checking that the setup/simulation 
outcomes satisfy target objective(s), design architectures, and 
core functional characteristics. Evaluation can be done by 
various agents; from the experiment developers to external 
individuals or standards organisations, in order to corroborate 
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The drivers that underpin design considerations in existing 
research indicate clear tensions between the ‘generality to suit a 
broad set of ICS domains and/or applications' and 'specificity to 
solve impending simulation challenges peculiar to domain or 
application'. Common interests tend to focus on the latter (i.e., 
specificity).  
The generality attribute can enable a capacity to mirror 
contexts and applications pertaining to multiple ICS domains 
without the need for significant re-configuration. Often this 
leads to a downside resulting from a lack of depth in system and 
process replication and analysis. Only high-level views of the 
system are captured, making up for 'breadth', but lacking in 
'depth' of context coverage. Specificity to particular security 
modelling simulation problems enables the adoption of design 
attributes which favour more focused coverage and in-depth 
analysis down to a detailed level. This enables a more tailored 
and a better understanding of simulation systems behaviour and 
performance. The approach appears more common in the 
community of designers and users perhaps because of the less 
demanding requirements related to; engaging a narrower area 
and view, and a lower level of expertise and specialisation.  
 
Despite the underlying use of similar hardware and software 
infrastructure in various ICS domains, design architectures, 
protocols, functionalities, operations often vary amongst sectors. 
Each sector application usually involves complex component 
and process interactions that require specialised knowledge and 
skills to implement. It is rarely feasible to find expertise in depth 
that spans multiple infrastructures and that would enable a 
broader ICS testbed implementation that is fit for multiple 
purposes. This would enable in-depth modelling and simulation 
of multi-modal sector applications, architectures, components, 
protocols, processes, interactions and complexities. 
Specialisation seem to occur because developers and users 
engaged in ICS security testbed design and simulation typically 
have expertise (deep knowledge and skills) in a specific ICS 
domain or a narrow area of application. 
 
6. Conclusion. 
Several factors need to be considered when evaluating the 
reliability of simulation systems, the research that use them and 
their outcomes to guide the perception of credibility.  Our 
research has explored literature and interacted with stakeholders 
to identify relevant factors that can provide guidance on ICS 
security testbed development and use, and which can support the 
decision on testbed credibility. We developed mapping 
framework (see Figure 1) outlining testbed design factors and 
how they co-relate to support credibility. This is used by 
following a testbed credibility-building process (see Figure 2) 
which provide a structured approach to apply the factors into 
design implementation. 
 
Demonstrating credibility in ICS security simulation 
testbeds remains an issue of concern, and the requirements to 
support this need to be streamlined. Building or enhancing 
credibility typically arises mainly from architectural coverage, 
characterised by the adopted implementation approach, selected 
components, and the demonstration of a reasonable degree of 
evaluation. These need to be engaged through a structured 
process, from defining security testbed design/simulation 
objectives to evaluating the work using the most 
feasible/available approaches. ICS security researchers and 
developers must strive to achieve fundamental architectures that 
are representative of real-world systems and can allow 
appropriate, yet realistic testing. 
 
The expertise (knowledge and experience) of researchers 
and developers is crucial relative to achieving defined objectives 
and scenarios. Clear security-related design objectives defined 
from the outset can help drive the testbed development process, 
maintain a focused direction, and contribute reliability to the 
outcome. Clarifying the testbed simulation approach provides a 
path to understanding the tools and techniques adopted and their 
simulation capabilities. It also provides the information needed 
to reproduce and validate simulation testbed designs/systems 
and associated research. A clear outline of the architectural 
composition, and the adopted testbed simulation approach, 
increases the potential for demonstrating scientific rigour and 
repeatability, adding credibility to claims of quality and fidelity. 
Demonstrating evaluation procedures across verification, 
validation, and(or) accreditation can help attest to the 
satisfaction of quality, value, and acknowledgement in 
communities beyond the immediate designers, developers, and 
researchers. Including evaluation details can help resolve 
queries related to if and how a security testbed was validated and 
persuade a wider acceptance of a claimed credibility state. 
Having simulation systems and testbeds subjected to this type of 
multi-level evaluation process against available credibility 
criteria, can evidence quality and trustworthiness for critical 
decision-making. 
 
It is beneficial to capture the core characteristics within a 
testbed setup. However, choosing the most important 
compliance characteristics within a specific project will depend 
on the project's core objectives and scope. Trade-offs may be 
needed, and considering the available resources/capabilities, 
certain characteristics may be incorporated or maximised at the 
expense of others. New attributes can also be considered based 
on emerging interests and evolving dynamics in the system or 
context of application. The proposed relationship mapping 
approach can promote effective and well-organized 
procurement of systems and sub-system components guided by 
clearly defined design requirements; responding to system and 
functional dynamics, and the endorsement of the relevant 
community of stakeholders. It can thereby streamline the task of 
setting requirements and reduce the costs of both infrastructure 
development and sub-system integration. It can lead to greater 
consistency and efficiency in developing research related to ICS 
security testbeds, building on what already exists. Most 
conveniently, by combining this with the growing trend and 
capability for federating ICS security testbeds, as has been 
keenly advocated and explored in recent publications, the 
potential is increased for testbed availability and 
interoperability. Furthermore, a federation architecture/system 
can minimise the diversity in design structures between different 
and physically dispersed testbed infrastructures. For future 
work, we will explore how ICS testbeds are evaluated, and how 
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Appendix A: ICS Security-related Testbed Works 
 
 Authors Paper Title Institution Country Objectives Approach 
Landscape
/Coverage 
Credibility Requirements Evaluation/Validation 
1 Giani et al 2008 
A Testbed for Secure and Robust SCADA 
Systems  
UC Berkeley USA VA, DMT SBS, EM, PS 
PP, FD, 
CG, CC 
Not Mentioned Not Mentioned 
2 Hieb et al 2008 
Security Enhancements for Distributed Control 
Systems  
University of Louisville USA DMT SBS CC/PP Not Mentioned Not Mentioned 
3 
Queiroz et al, 
2009 
Building a SCADA Security Testbed  RMIT University Australia AA SBS, EM PP, CG, CC Modularity, Fidelity Base on Prior works 
4 
Bergman et al 
2009 
The Virtual Power System Testbed and Inter-
Testbed Integration  
University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign 







5 Kush et al 2010 















Chunlei et al 
2010 
A Simulation Environment for SCADA 
Security Analysis and Assessment  
Tsinghua University of 
Beijing 








Fovino et al 
2010 
An Experimental Platform for Assessing 
SCADA Vulnerabilities and Countermeasures 
in Power Plants  
European Commission 
Joint Research Centre 
Italy AA, IA PS 
PP, FD, 
CG, CC 
Repeatability, Safe Execution Not Mentioned 
8 Hahn et al 2010 
Development of the PowerCyber SCADA 
Security Testbed  
Iowa State University USA ET, AA, EM PP, CG, CC Fidelity 










AA, TA, VA, 
IA 




Cyber Risk Assessment of Power Control 
Systems – A Metrics weighed by Attack 
Experiments  
Ricerca sul Sistema 
Energetico 








11 Morris et al 2011 
A control system testbed to validate critical 









Fidelity Not Mentioned 
12 
Mallouhi et al 
2011 
A Testbed for Analyzing Security of SCADA 
Control Systems (TASSCS)  
University of Arizona USA DMT SBS 
FD, CG, 
CC 
Not Mentioned Not Mentioned 
13 Jin et al 2011 
An Event Buffer Flooding Attack In DNP3 
Controlled Scada Systems  
University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign  
USA AA, VA PS  CG, CC 
Flexibility, Extensibility 
(Scalability) 
Based on a Real Design 
Testbed 
14 
Almalawi et al 
2013 
SCADAVT–A Framework for SCADA 
Security Testbed Based on Virtualization 
Technology 









Sayegh et al 
2013 
Internal Security Attacks on SCADA Systems  
American University of 
Beirut 




Shahzad et al 
2013 
Secure Cryptography Testbed Implementation 
for SCADA Protocols Security  
University Kuala 
Lumpur 
Malaysia DMT SBS 
Not 
Mentioned 
Not Mentioned Not Mentioned 
17 Urias et al 2013 
Supervisory Command and Data Acquisition 
(SCADA) system Cyber Security Analysis 




USA VA, AA 
SBS, EM/V, 
PS 







 Authors Paper Title Institution Country Objectives Approach 
Landscape
/Coverage 
Credibility Requirements Evaluation/Validation 
18 Stites et al 2013 
Smart Grid Security Educational Training with 
Thunder Cloud: A Virtual Security Test Bed 
Tennessee Technological 
University 
USA ET, VA, AA EM/V PP, CC, CG Cost-Effective 
user-defined 
requirements 
19 Hahn et al 2013 
Cyber-Physical Security Testbeds: 
Architecture, Application, and Evaluation for 
Smart Grid  







20 Gao et al 2014 
An Industrial Control System Testbed Based 













McLaughlin et al 
2014 
Multi-attribute SCADA-Specific Intrusion 
Detection System for Power Networks  
Queen's University 
Belfast 






Cyber-Physical Testbeds - EPIC 
European Commission 












Scalability, Safe Execution 
(Safety) 
Compliant with design 
standards (IEEE 9, 30, 
39 and 118) 
23 
Haney and Papa 
2014 
A framework for the design and deployment of 
a SCADA honeynet 
The University of Tulsa USA DMT,  
SBS, EM/V, 
PS 
  Not Mentioned Not Mentioned 
24 
Candell et al 
2015 
An Industrial Control System Cybersecurity 
Performance Testbed 
National Institute of 
Standards and 
Technology (NIST) 







Scalability, Fidelity, Security 
Analysis, Extensibility 
Compliant with NIST SP 
800-82 Security 
guidelines 
25 Singh et al 2015 
A Testbed for SCADA Cyber Security and 
Intrusion Detection  
Centre for Development 
of Advanced Computing  
India DMT, AA,  SBS, EM PP, FD, CG Not Mentioned Not Mentioned 
26 
Koutsandria et al 
2015 
A Real-Time Testbed Environment for Cyber-
Physical Security on the Power Grid 
Sapienza University of 
Rome, Arizona State 





AA SBS, EM, PS 
PP, FD, 
CG, CC 
Fidelity, Repeatability Not Mentioned 
27 
Farooqui et al 
2015 
Cyber Security Backdrop: A SCADA Testbed  
National University of 
Sciences and 
Technology 




Development of Cyber Security Testbed for 
Critical Infrastructure  
Military University of 
Technology  




A Hardware-in-the-Loop SCADA Testbed  
University of South 
Florida 
USA AA, DMT 
SBS, 
EM/HIL,  
CC, CG Not Mentioned 
Complaint with IEEE-
C37.118 and Modbus 
protocol design 
30 
Ghaleb et al 
2016 
SCADA-SST: A SCADA Security Testbed  
King Fahd University of 
Petroleum & Minerals 
Saudi 
Arabia 











Characterization of Cyberattacks aimed at 
Integrated Industrial Control and Enterprise 
Systems: A case study  




PS PP, CC, CG 
Believed To Be 
Representative Of The Real 
Systems 
Validation 
32 Cruz et al 2016 
A Cybersecurity Detection Framework for 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
Systems 
University of Coimbra  Portugal DMT, TA,  SBS, EM PP, FD, CG 
Fidelity, Repeatability, Data 
Accuracy 
Validated by comparing 
normal and attack 
scenarios results 
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 Authors Paper Title Institution Country Objectives Approach 
Landscape
/Coverage 





SWaT: A Water Treatment Testbed for 
Research and Training on ICS Security 
Singapore University of 









Third Party Developers none 
34 
Korkmaz et al 
2016 
ICS Security Testbed with Delay Attack Case 
Study 
Binghamton University USA IA, DMT, ET PS PP, FD, CG 





Ahmed et al 
2016 
A SCADA System Testbed for Cybersecurity 
and Forensic Research and Pedagogy 








Fidelity, Modularity Not Mentioned 
36 Neg et al 2016 
A SCADA testbed for Cyber Security 
Education & Research 
Indian Institute of 
Technology  
India 





Flexibility Not Mentioned 
37 Alves et al 2016 
Virtualization of Industrial Control System 
Testbeds for Cybersecurity  
University of Alabama 
in Huntsville  







Soupionis et al 
2016 
Cyber Security Impact on Power Grid 
Including Nuclear Plant  
European Commission, 
Joint Research Centre 
(JRC) 





Not Mentioned Not Mentioned 
39 Green et al 2017 
Pains, Gains and PLCs: Ten Lessons from 
Building an Industrial Control Systems 
Testbed for Security Research 
Lancaster University England 










PERA Reference Model 
& Other prior testbed 
infrastructures 
40 
Koganti et al, 
2017 
A Virtual Testbed for Security Management of 
Industrial Control Systems 




Security of Cyber-Physical Systems From 
Theory to Testbeds and Validation  
Universit ́e Paris-Saclay  France AA, ET PS, EM PP, CG, CC Repeatability, Cost-Effective Not Mentioned 
 
